TEHRAN — Pakistan stands at the center of international diplomacy as efforts continue to end nearly two months of multiple war theaters in the Middle East. Leveraging its unique ties with both Tehran and Washington, Islamabad has so far helped secure a two-week ceasefire, creating a crucial window for negotiations on a lasting end to the conflict.

As Iran’s next-door neighbor, Pakistan came under intense pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join a war against Iran. Islamabad, however, chose a different course — one that could reshape the regional balance of power.
Tehran Times sat down with Javed Rana, a senior Pakistani journalist and geo-strategic affairs expert, to discuss the new political and strategic realities emerging after Iran’s unexpected military gains in more than six weeks of war with Israel and its key backer, the United States.

The following is the full text of the interview:

With Pakistan emerging as a new mediator in Iran–U.S. negotiations, what strategic considerations are motivating Islamabad to take on this role? How does Pakistan’s diplomatic leverage compare with traditional intermediaries like Oman or Qatar?

Well, before I come to the last part of your question, Pakistan was in a kind of fix when this war was imposed upon Iran. On one side, there was Saudi Arabia with which Pakistan has a defense pact, and on the other hand, there was neighboring Iran, with which Pakistan has excellent relations.

Then, of course, the Americans always look for some kind of behind-the-scenes arrangements. The fact that Pakistan shares around a 900-kilometer border with Iran. So certainly, one can safely assume that the CIA would have been demanding Pakistan’s cooperation —to provide it military bases or share intelligence about Iran’s strategic locations.

So I think Pakistan faced pressure from all sides. Islamabad had to take a decision that did not alienate anyone. Pakistan did not support anyone militarily, but at the same time, it had to adopt a position where it could help resolve the problem rather than become part of it.

Frankly speaking, the bigger pressure came from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were trying to invoke the so-called defense pact against Iran. The UAE was also putting pressure on Pakistan to retaliate against Iran — as if Iran had attacked Pakistan. But Pakistan could not have attacked Iran; that was simply not possible.

Yes, there has been public support for the defense pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, but that pact was meant for defensive purposes  against apartheid Israel— not against a brotherly Muslim country.
Pakistan, which has a long history of dealing with superpowers and navigating great-power politics, reacted in a matured manner. Islamabad coordinated with Turkey and tried to prevail upon Saudi Arabia . In my view, this effort turned out to be successful.

Pakistan conveyed to Saudi Arabia that Iran is not your enemy. The real challenge comes from Israel. For a variety of reasons, I would call Israel an apartheid theocratic state with expansionist designs.

Based on misleading ideological scriptures, apartheid Israel is pursuing  expansionist ambitions in the region.  Destabilizing Muslim countries through chaos and wars and pitting them against one and another is part of Israeli long strategy. Therefore, Pakistan argued that it would not be advisable to attack Iran at a time when Israel and the United States were already carrying out large scale airstrikes on Iran.

At that moment, Iran’s airspace was already under intense military pressure from Israel and the United States. So the question was: what more could be achieved by escalating the situation further?

It was simply a matter of common sense.

By retaliating against Iran, Pakistan would have created a large-scale public perception across Muslim countries that Pakistan was acting as a puppet state and siding with Israel. People would not focus on the so-called defense pact; instead, the narrative would have been  that Pakistan was aligning itself against a fellow Muslim country.

With that kind of arguments, I assume Pakistan managed to convince Saudi Arabia. The UAE is an extension of apartheid Israel in the Middle East or it acts as a satellite state of Zionist entity.

The challenge for Pakistan was that it had taken loans of around $3 to $4 billion from the UAE over the years. To increase pressure, the UAE reportedly asked Pakistan to return these loans, some of which date back to 1996. Pakistan opted to return the loans despite its fragile economic conditions.

Pakistan’s relations with the UAE have therefore become strained. However, I believe  this as a blessing in disguise for Pakistan.  The UAE has been involved in destabilizing activities, particularly in southwestern Baluchistan, where the UAE along with

India and Israel has been supporting terrorist groups. I suspect the UAE’s investments in Pakistan help it conduct espionage against the national security interests of Pakistan. 
In this broader context, a rollback of such investments would, serve Pakistan’s national security interests.

Coming back to your question, another factor was the proposal for Pakistan to broker a deal. From the Iranian strategic perspective, even if the United States had militarily degraded Iran, Tehran retains a strategic edge. The Americans, in my view, underestimated Iran’s military strength and geostrategic posturing.

Iranian policymakers tend to think in long-term strategically. They don’t make their decisions for short-term gains.

Washington underestimated the military strength of Iran. And now Iran’s retaliation pattern has reshaped the strategic environment in the Middle East.

Iran expanded the theater of confrontation by targeting key assets across the region, including radar systems and military infrastructure in various Middle Eastern locations. This created a shock in Washington and altered regional calculations.

Another major strategic factor was the Strait of Hormuz. Even the threat to this vital maritime chokepoint affected global markets. Around 20 percent of global oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and a significant portion of Asian energy imports depends on this route. Any disruption caused inflationary pressure globally, including in the United States and Europe.

This had political implications for U.S. domestic politics, particularly as midterm elections approached. In that context, the United States reportedly sought Pakistan’s assistance. Pakistan, for its part, was willing to help, creating a convergence of interests between Pakistan and the United States on one side, and Pakistan and Iran on the other.

Pakistan therefore played a role close to try to broker a deal. Unlike Oman, Pakistan emerged as a different kind of player as Pakistan has institutional capacity. While Pakistan’s military has historically been deeply involved in politics — a controversial and debated issue domestically — nonetheless it has also accumulated decades of diplomatic and strategic experience.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office likewise has a long diplomatic history. In 1971, Pakistan facilitated the diplomatic opening between China and the United States. In the late 1980s, Pakistan played a role in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan through Geneva accord. More recently, in 2020, Pakistan helped facilitate negotiations that led to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan through talks with the Taliban.

With that background, handling this crisis was not as difficult for Pakistan as it might have been for Oman or other countries. Pakistan was uniquely positioned because it had much to lose — facing pressure from Saudi Arabia, the United States to help them militarily, and expectations from Iran to stay neutral.

Unlike earlier mediation frameworks where talks were indirect, Pakistan appears to have engaged both parties more actively. For example, there were disagreements at the outset: the United States reportedly demanded that Iran abandon its nuclear program altogether, while Iran signaled willingness to put mortarium — possibly for five years.

Pakistan attempted to bridge the gap by exploring middle-ground proposals, potentially around ten years. In this sense, Pakistan contributed ideas and helped shape elements of the proposed deal.

The framework, in my view, may resemble the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), though with amendments reflecting new geopolitical realities.

Pakistan engaged in the detailed negotiations, offering input to both Iran and the United States. As a result, the two sides moved closer to a potential agreement.

What exactly the deal will look like remains unclear. However, I believe it could represent a strategic win for Iran. In my view, this process could mark the beginning of a gradual reduction of the American military footprint in the Middle East.

I really doubt that Arab states are going to trust the United States again. American military bases across the Gulf states have turned into liabilities for them. They attracted retaliatory attacks from Iran. Had these military bases not there, the situation would not have deteriorated so severely for Arab states, particularly the UAE, whose economy came close to a serious downturn.

Therefore, I think there is now a rethinking process underway in the Middle East about the future security architecture — and who will provide security guarantees. Many of these states deliberately kept their own militaries weak because they feared that strong armed forces could stage coups. As a result, they remained dependent on external security umbrellas.

Now they are looking for a new security framework.

In my view, the UAE is playing a negative role. It is reportedly advising some Arab states that have not yet normalized relations with Israel to consider an Israeli security umbrella. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey are proposing alternative ideas — including a potential military alliance involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The idea behind such a framework would be that the real threat is not Iran but regional instability and external aggression from the apartheid Israel.

I expect that a four-country alliance would eventually emerge. It would not be Iran-focused, because Iran’s retaliation targeted U.S. military bases — as there were being used to attack on Iran. The Gulf states themselves had allowed Americans to establish military bases on their territories in early 1990s after Iraq had attacked Kuwait.

These states often talk about the breach of their sovereignty after Iran retaliated on the US military bases they have been hosting. But the question arises: what kind of sovereignty they were talking about when they themselves allowed foreign military forces to station on their land.

This is why I believe Iran has gained strategically. From the beginning, Iran has consistently called for the end of the American military presence in the Middle East. The United States maintains numerous military installations across the region, and this war may gradually lead to the US military footprint in the region.

It may not happen immediately — not in days, weeks, or even months — but over the years, I believe it will occur.

The political mindset of Donald Trump, in particular, is not inclined toward long-term military spending abroad. He would expect Gulf states to finance the reconstruction of damaged military bases, potentially costing trillions of dollars. I doubt those Arab states would be willing to bear such costs, especially when they now see these bases as liabilities and not a security umbrella any more.

In that sense, Iran has achieved a strategic success.

Iran’s economy has suffered due to U.S. and European sanctions. However, there is an important takeaway: a country with strong military capabilities can remain secure even with economic challenges. Conversely, countries with strong economies but weak military capabilities remain vulnerable. The case in point Iran versus Gulf States.

This is the strategic choice Iran made decades ago. Its military strength has now delivered results that might not have been achievable through economic power alone. Iran’s military capability,  may ultimately  help it to rebuild a shattered economy.
On the other hand, the lack of strong military capabilities and dependence on Americans, has turned out to be a counter productive for Arab monarchs. 

There is also a historical analogy often cited in strategic discussions. Some policymakers have referred to lessons from early Islamic history, particularly emphasizing the importance of maintaining defensive capabilities even under economic hardship. These examples are often invoked to highlight the value of strategic deterrence.

Pakistan, too, has drawn lessons from such strategic thinking. As a nuclear power, Pakistan believes strong deterrence enhances national security.
In my view, this entire episode may also mark the beginning of broader political change in the region. It may not be immediately visible, but over the years, the consequences of this war could reshape regional leadership dynamics.

 With a second round of negotiations likely to take place, what are the prospects for success? What confidence-building measures could help advance the talks, and how optimistic are you about a potential breakthrough?

Let’s look at the bigger picture. The United States needs a face-saving.  Washington has been trying to create the impression that it still holds a military edge. However, the global audience is aware of the realities on the ground.

There is also the issue of U.S. naval deployments in the Arabian Sea. These deployments appear aimed at creating optics for domestic audiences in the United States — suggesting that American coercive diplomacy forced Iran into negotiations. In my view, this is not true.

Iran maintained pressure in the Strait of Hormuz which forced Israel to move toward a ceasefire with Lebanon under US pressure. That is the reality. If U.S. naval ships remain in the region, they are largely symbolic and meant for domestic consumption in the United States, rather than to encircle Iran.

Even if these naval deployments continue, I believe a nuclear deal is close. However, one should never underestimate what I describe as Israeli efforts to derail diplomacy.

For example, Israel derailed a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon by escalating violence which led to killing of hundreds of Lebanoni  citizens. There were also genuine security concerns when the Iranian delegation traveled to Pakistan for negotiations. Pakistan reportedly provided air escort due to fears that Israeli forces might target the delegation.

Such measures sent a message to apartheid Israel that Pakistan is committed to facilitating diplomatic channel for a negotiated settlement of a bigger crises in the Middle East.

As we speak, preparations for Monday’s talks are underway in Islamabad. Security measures have reportedly been heightened. Areas around the Serena Hotel, which is expected to host the second round of talks, have been secured, and traffic restrictions have been imposed.

Pakistan appears particularly cautious about potential disruptions to the negotiations. I believe the negotiations are likely to succeed. This conflict has led to new regional alignments and created new diplomatic momentum. Pakistan’s mediation has strengthened ties with Iran and positioned Islamabad as a trusted interlocutor.

This conflict has also intensified geopolitical rivalries in the region. In my view, ideological divisions between regional actors are becoming more pronounced. Pakistan, Iran, and possibly Afghanistan could emerge as a natural bloc.
Despite this, I believe the current phase of the conflict may end soon with American military involvement in future war theatre may diminish.  However, tensions are unlikely to disappear entirely.

Another important development is the shift in global public opinion. Israel’s genocide in Gaza and confrontation with Iran have, in my view, affected its international standing, including in Western countries and the United States.

This could have long-term implications. Future U.S. administrations may not necessarily be anti-Israel, but they may also be less inclined to provide unconditional support to Zionist entity. This could possibly means less military aid, diplomatic backing, and political support to Israel at international forums such as  the United Nations Security Council.

In that sense, Iran may gain strategically over the long term. Although Iran has faced economic difficulties due to sanctions over the past four decades, there are signs that expectations of improved diplomatic relations could strengthen economic prospects.

There has already been speculation in the global markets regarding possibility of a potential recovery of Iran’s currency and economy if military standoff eases down in near future. If a deal is reached, Iran could begin rebuilding its economy.

However, tensions with Israel are likely to continue even after a possible deal. Ahead of general elections in Israel, the hardline politicians Naftali Bennet  have launched a dangerous elections campaign building up narratives to target  Turkey after Iran ends.

This has prompted countries such as Turkey to explore broader security cooperation frameworks involving Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Pakistan also views regional developments cautiously. Islamabad believes that instability in Iran could have broader implications for regional security, including Pakistan itself.

Pakistan’s strategic thinking also reflects concerns about hybrid warfare — including economic pressure, intelligence operations, and support for militant groups by Israel, had Iranian government fallen to Israeli and the US aggression. The US has been playing Israeli game plans with Pakistan. 

For example, during Pakistan’s negotiations with the US behind the scene to seek Washongton’s influence to seek IMF bailout package about three years ago, Americans tried to pressurize Islamabad to compromise its long range missile program as Israel felt threatened. 

Islamabad rejected the US pressure and maintained that its missile capabilities are primarily India-centric and not Israel specific. 

Public sentiment in Pakistan also plays a role. There is strong public sympathy for Palestine causes and, now increasingly, for Iran. These public sentiments cut across sectarian divisions given the fact that Pakistanis love to hate Israel.

Overall, I believe the negotiations are likely to move forward. While challenges remain, the broader geopolitical momentum favors diplomacy. If successful, this process could mark a turning point in regional politics and open the door for economic recovery of Iran. 

Do you think Iran and the United States are close to reaching an agreement, or is a breakthrough still some distance away?

I hope that happens. I am very optimistic that there will be a deal between Iran and the United States.

By and large, most of the details appear to have been finalized. The critical part concerns the nuclear issue, and I believe an understanding already exists. There are still divergent views regarding the number of years Iran would suspend uranium enrichment. As you know, enrichment is permitted under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) framework, but Iran appears willing to temporarily forego certain aspects of its enrichment activities for a limited period.

Such a move would provide a face-saving to the US President Donald Trump. This would help him to project the proposed agreement to his domestic audience as a diplomatic achievement. 

I am less certain about what will happen regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Even if no formal arrangement emerges on that front. However,  Iran has already established a new strategic reality — that any attack on Iran could potentially result in disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. This alone has altered global strategic calculations.

There are also reports suggesting that the United States may release part of Iran’s frozen assets, estimated at around $20 billion. If implemented, this would be a significant confidence-building measure.

Additionally, there is discussion about a possible United Nations Security Council resolution that could provide guarantees against further military escalation. While international law and UN resolutions are not always fully implemented, such mechanisms still represent the most viable international framework available.

However, Israel often operates outside these frameworks, and there is a perception that international law has limited influence over Israeli decision-making. This creates uncertainty even if an agreement is reached.

If the deal is finalized, it could have political implications in Israel as well. In my view, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could face domestic political pressure if diplomacy succeeds.

Another important point is that one of the longstanding objectives of the United States and Israel has been regime change in Iran. However, Iran’s system is not merely a government — it is rooted in ideology. Governments can be changed and leaders can be targeted, but ideology is far more difficult to eliminate.

This is something, in my view, that Western policymakers underestimated. For example, even after targeted assassinations of political and military leaders in Iran, the governance system has remained intact. Similar dynamics have been observed in other movements in the region such as Hamas whose top leadership were assassinated one after the other, nonetheless  ideological and organizational structures of Hamas remains intact. Hamas is not only surviving but begins to thrives now on the ground. 

This reflects a broader strategic reality: ideological movements cannot easily be defeated through military means alone. Even when leadership figures are removed, organizational structures and support networks continue to operate.

In that broader context, the underlying message for both Israel and the United States is that they are confronting an ideological reality that emphasizes resistance and exercise long-term strategic patience. This makes the conflict more complex and difficult to resolve through military pressure alone.

How do you interpret the strategic objectives behind the U.S. naval blockade of Iran? Is it designed as a military pressure tactic, or as diplomatic leverage aimed at shaping negotiations?

I think it is more about propaganda aimed at domestic audiences in the United States. It appears to have designed to create the optics that American coercive diplomacy — and the use of force — has brought Iran to the negotiating table.

This so-called blockade has not materially changed the situation on the ground. Chinese vessels, for example, have continued to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and its trade with Iran has continued. Therefore, the blockade has not had a significant practical impact.

However, Western media outlets often amplify Washington’s narrative, portraying the deployment as a sign of strength. In that sense, the naval deployment is largely a political and media tool, aimed at presenting Donald Trump as a strong leader.

Once the war ends, I believe this blockade will fade from discussion. Instead, attention may shift to the broader economic implications of the conflict. One possible outcome is the growing use of alternative currencies, particularly the Chinese yuan, in regional trade.

If countries in the Middle East increasingly conduct oil transactions in yuan rather than U.S. dollars, this could gradually reduce global demand for the dollar. Given that the U.S. economy is already heavily indebted — with its national debt exceeding $39 trillion — such developments could contribute to inflationary pressures in the United States.

Gulf monarchies have historically played a key role in supporting the dollar-based global financial system. If they diversify their financial arrangements, it could have long-term implications for the U.S. economy.

In that sense, Iran may have achieved a strategic gain by accelerating discussions about alternatives to dollar-based trade. While this shift may not be immediately visible, it could have significant long-term consequences.

 Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, recently concluded a three-day visit to Tehran as part of Islamabad’s mediation efforts. Do you see this visit as a potential turning point in Pakistan’s diplomatic role?

The domestic political context in Pakistan is important. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who remains highly popular, is currently in jail on charges that his supporters describe as politically motivated. There have also been allegations from opposition parties regarding bogus elections results which deprived Khan’s party to form federal government in early 2024.

As a result, the Pakistani military’s political role is viewed critically by majority within Pakistan. However, when it comes to foreign policy and national security,  the military has been playing an a decisive role over the years. So is the case this time around. 

In this case, General Asim Munir appears to have played a constructive role. As a former military intelligence chief and head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), he has extensive experience dealing with political and diplomatic issues. That experience has helped him contribute to mediation efforts between Iran and the United States.

It is also important to recognize the role of Pakistan’s Foreign Office and foreign minister, who worked alongside the military leadership. Together, they helped bridge differences between the two sides.

Pakistan’s leadership reportedly encouraged Iran to consider limited concessions as part of a broader strategic calculations. While such concessions might appear as compromises in the short term, the argument is that Iran could gain strategically in the long run — particularly if this process contributes to reducing the American military footprint in the Middle East.

In that sense, General Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran may indeed represent a significant moment in Pakistan’s mediation efforts.

Do you believe General Asim Munir personally influenced the negotiations?

I think General Asim Munir was in a unique position. While I cannot speak definitively about his personal views on Israel, it is reasonable to assume that Pakistan’s leadership is mindful of regional dynamics and Israeli covert and overt policies against Muslim countries.

In this broader context, General Munir appears to have direct access to the U.S. President Donald Trump. There have been allegations on how Trump’s family was provided lucrative  mineral and crypto currency deals by Pakistan in the recent past, something which has helped General Asim Munir to enjoy personal ties with Trump.

This is how Pakistan where army calls shot of all that matters, managed to win over White House. His personal ties with Trump has helped to offset US pressure to set Imran Khan free from Jail.  

Imran Khan,  is widely perceived as unifying force to serve Muslim cause and he is opposed to apartheid Israel’s hegemonic designs in the Middle East. 

In this context, General Munir appears to have acted in a sagaciously   One of the major disagreements between Iran and the United States centered on Iran’s civil nuclear program. While Washington initially demand that Iran abandon its nuclear program altogether, Tehran insisted on retaining its civilian nuclear capabilities.

It appears that a middle ground may have been agreed upon. My assessment is that Iran may agreed to suspend certain aspects of its nuclear program for a limited period — possibly around ten years — though this remains speculative.

Pakistan’s role, therefore, seems to have involved helping both sides find face-saving. Pakistan’s Foreign Office, along with the foreign minister and senior diplomats, played an important role in shaping elements of the proposed agreement.

Unlike traditional mediators such as Oman, Pakistan brought a different level of diplomatic and strategic engagements. Pakistan’s leadership appears to have worked actively to engineer parts of the proposed deal and has brought both sides closer to agreement. The only fear is the possibility of Israel doing something nasty to derail the proposed deal. And that is a real threat. 

Finally, is there any key aspect of the evolving regional situation or the ongoing negotiations that you believe deserves further attention but has not been addressed?

I believe a new strategic situation has emerged in the Middle East and in the wider region. Iran may need to adopt a new diplomatic posturings.

In the past, conflict in  Syria and Iraq and Yamen led to accusations that Iran was fueling sectarian tensions. Given the current regional environment, Iran should remain mindful of these perceptions. There is currently growing sympathy for Iran in countries like Pakistan, and Tehran should avoid actions or messaging that could revive sectarian divisions once this war hopefully is all over.

There have been some isolated failed attempts to stoke sectarian tensions, but public sentiment has largely resisted such efforts. Nevertheless, Iran should exercise caution in the coming months and years.

There is also the possibility of a four-country military alliance involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. If such an alliance emerges, Iran could potentially join it in the future. This would represent a significant shift in regional security dynamics.

Iran may benefit from projecting itself as a country that transcends beyond sectarian divides. At present, public perception is favorable toward Iran, and maintaining that perception would strengthen Tehran’s strategic position.

If Iran were eventually to join such a regional framework — particularly alongside Pakistan, which possesses nuclear deterrence capabilities — it could significantly reduce the likelihood of future military confrontation against Iran.

Another broader strategic point is that nuclear deterrence has historically influenced U.S. military options. For example, countries such as North Korea and Pakistan have not faced direct US military aggression because their their nuclear capabilities.

The hard geo-strategic realities in the world suggest that Iran should carefully consider its long-term strategic options. Getting hold of weapons strategic deterrence would ultimately deter the US and Israel to repeat committing aggression against Iran.

Countries that do not possess nuclear weapons often remain vulnerable to external threats. For example, Libya faced US military intervention after it abandoned its nuclear program — a development many analysts describe as a harsh geopolitical reality.

Similarly, Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia and the United States under the Budapest Memorandum. However, subsequent events raised serious questions about the reliability of such guarantees after Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022.

In my personal view, countries which do not possess nuclear deterrence, would always remain vulnerable to external military intervention, therefore, nuclear deterrence is often seen as a critical factor that shapes strategic stability in hard geo-strategic world.